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Abstract: 
Unions and the Link: Wage determination by a single encompassing trade union when 
unempioyment benefits are linked to wages. 
J.A. Vijlbrief, R.F. van de Wijngaert 
In this paper, we introducé a model which analyzes the wage and employment effects 
of linking the level of unempioyment benefits to the wage rate. We have based the 
government's behaviour on its empirical significance. Therefore, the government Is 
assumed to apply simple policy rules, which correspond to policies that were actually 
used in the Netherlands over the 1970-1991 period. Due to this specification, the 
model describes constrained utility maximization by the union. 
Under some general assumptions, the model yields the following predic-
tions. Firstly, if the government prefers to fix the level of benefits, wages are lowest 
and, assuming a negatively sloped labour demand curve, employment is highest. 
Secondly, if the government decides to link the level of benefits to private sector 
wages, the wage rate will be highest, and hence, employment lowest. Thirdly, if the 
government decides to make the link conditional, the wage and employment out-
comès are between these extreme outcomes. Estimations of an equilibrium wage 
equation for the Netherlands do not reject the hypothesis that the equilibrium wage 
rate is lower if the link is abolished. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In the Netheriands, social security benefits are automatically indexed to market sector 
wages by the so-called 'link'. The restoration of the link by the third Lubbers govern-
ment in 1990 was a victory for the social-democrats, who regard the link as an 
important instrument for an equitabie income policy. However, the linking of benefits to 
private sector wages caused serious financial problems for the Dutch govemment in 
the 1970s: wage increases in lead of labour productivity growth and unfavourable 
external conditions raised unemployment in the Netheriands and, consequently, 
increased expenditures for social security. Therefore, the restoration of the link was 
conditional. First, the ratio of active versus inactive people should not fall and second, 
having learned from the experience in the seventies, the development of private sector 
wages shouid not be 'irresponsible', /.e. the rise in wages should not endanger private 
sector employment. 
In 1990, unfavourable developments for the government budget have caused 
a continuous discussion about the link: can the Dutch govemment afford the automatic 
indexation of benefits to wages? A major point in answering this question is whether 
the rise in private sector wages is not too high. In this paper, the effects of the link on 
wages and employment are studied. It nas already been shown that the link itself can 
be responsible for high union wage claims and deteriorating employment, in the case 
of an unconditional indexation of benefits to private sector wages (see Mulder, 1988a). 
The reasoning behind this result is simple: the trade union will be stimulated to raise 
the wage rate when unemployment benefits rise with private sector wages. However, 
the present model accounts for the conditionality of the link in the Netheriands: the 
abolishment of the link is very likely when the government experiences financial 
problems. 
In this paper we focus on the wage and employment effects of the automatic 
indexation of unemployment benefits to private sector wages, assuming that the Dutch 
government follows a simple policy rule: it aims at the maintenance of balanced-budget 
and stabilization of the burden of taxation. If the link causes too much additional 
government expenditures, it will be abolished in order to prevent taxes from rising. 
Neither a larger budget deficit, nor a cut in its expenditure on public goods are seen as 
alternatives for the abolition of the link. Hence, we assume that the two conditions, 
actually used by the Dutch govemment (stabilization of the ratio between working and 
non-working people and a moderate wage increase), are mereiy instruments to attain 
the goal of stabilizing the tax rate. 
A rational trade union will take this policy rule into consideration when setting 
1 
the wage rate. Hence, by making the link conditional, the government mitigates the 
adverse effects of the link on the wage rate and employment. From an efficiency point 
of view one might still prefer the abolition of the link, but the costs of the link (in terms 
of a loss in employment) should not be exaggerated. In the Calmfors and Driffill (1988) 
framework, a conditional link can be regarded as a policy instrument to intemalize part 
of the external costs of the link: the unions are forced into responsibility for the 
maintenance of the link. This policy can be regarded as a 'corporatist alternative' to the 
complete abolition of the link. 
In Section 2 of this paper, we gfve a short survey of the literature on this 
subject. Section 3 contains an outline of the model, whereas Section 4 discusses the 
effects of different benefit and tax policies, including a policy that conditionally links 
benefits to wages. Section 5 investigates whether the data reject the hypothesis that 
wages in the Netherlands are raised by the linking of benefits to private sector wages. 
Section 6 summarizes this paper. 
2 SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 
In the 1950s, the theory on wage determination to a great extent relied on the Phillips-
curve, which explains wage increases by excess demand in the labour market. Despite 
lts empirical success, the Phillips-curve has been criticised on two grounds. First, ft is 
theoretically unsatisfactory to assume monopsony in the labour market as the Phillips-
curve does. Second, it ignores institutions in the labour market, such as the trade 
union. 
The theory on wage determination in the 1960s and 1970S paid only little 
attention to the modelling of the trade union in the labour market. The literature on 
wage formation in the 1980s, conversely, has integrated the wage setting behaviour of 
trade unions into mainstream theory. In this type of models a single trade union is 
assumed to maximise a well-defined utility function under grven constraints of the 
employer's behaviour. Oswald (1982) has popularised Dunlop's (1944) 'monopoly 
union model' in which the union is assumed to set the wage level, whereas the 
employer determines the level of employment. Nickell and Andrews (1983) have chal-
lenged this view, assuming that union and employers bargain over wage and employ-
ment (the so-called 'right to manage model'). Nevertheless, McDonald and Solow 
(1981) have argued that these models do not share the Pareto efficiency criterion so 
that unions and employers are better off bargaining over wages and employment 
simultaneously, as in the 'efficiënt bargaining model'. 
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The atomistic bargaining models have been devised to describe decentraiised 
markets. But, for many European countries, bargaining takes place at the intermediate 
or centralised level, where (a) trade union federation(s) face(s) (an) employers organiz-
ation(s) and the government. Under these conditions, not only does the govemment 
take the behaviour of unions into account when formulating its policy, trade unions 
also have to consider govemment reactions when bargaining. Economie policy and 
wage setting can, therefore, be analyzed as a game between the govemment and the 
trade union. In order to study centralised wage determination, a three parties bargain-
ing model has emerged in the iiterature, in which a single encompassing trade union is 
involved in two games: one game with an employers' organization and one with the 
government. In the earlier contributions, the govemment pursues an active employment 
policy (see e.g. Calmfors and Hom, 1986, Hersoug, 1986, and Driffill, 1986), whereas 
later contributions focus on income policies (Mulder, 1988a). 
The three parties bargaining model is, however, not undisputed (Calmfors, 
1986). First, the assumption that the union sets the wage, whilst the employer sets 
employment (the monopoly union model) ignores wage bargaining, which is a widely 
observed phenomenon in Europe. However, there is little need to specify explicit wage 
bargaining between the union and the employer, since Oswald (1986) nas shown that 
the predictions of the monopoly union model are simiiar to the 'right to manage 
model'. Furthermore, employers' organizations are usualiy not empowered to bargain 
the level of employment in negotiations at the national level (at least not in the Nether-
lands), making it unnecessary to use the efficiënt bargaining model. 
A second problem constitutes the modelling of govemment preferences. The 
govemment may either be conceived of maximising a social welfare function, or it may 
be assumed to carry out a policy rule, prescribing a policy which is at issue at that 
moment. The advantage of a social welfare function, including the level of private con-
sumption (as in Mulder, 1988a) or a loss-function (as in: Driffill, 1986, and Hersoug, 
1986), is that government behaviour can be analyzed in line with the Standard game-
theoretical Iiterature. Alternatively, by specifying simple policy rules (i.e. reaction func-
tions, as in Calmfors and Hom, 1986), the govemment's behaviour is not derived from 
explicit optimization. 
The modelling of the game between the government and the trade union 
comprises the third problem. If the game is confined to one period, co-operative 
solutions are ruled out since they are either very unstable (Hersoug, 1986, 141-145) or 
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unenforceabie without commitment (Driffill, 1986) . However, by playing the game 
repeatediy, as in multi-period games, both punishments and rewards and reputation-
effects come into play. The 'Folk Theorem' then predicts that it becomes more likely 
that two players will play co-operatively, if they do not see a time-horizon looming 
(Kreps, 1990). Nevertheless, for democratie societies, it can hardly be maintained that 
the same govemment will be in power for ever. Therefore, it is our view that in 
repeated games with a relative low number of game stages, co-operative behaviour is 
not very likely2. 
If the union-govemment game is played unco-operatfvely, two possible game-
theoretical solution concepts emerge: the Nash- and the Stackelberg-equilibrium. If 
both players are assumed to make their moves simultaneously (as in Mulder, 1988a), 
the Nash-equilibrium is the appropriate solution to the game. Conversely, in the 
Stackelberg-equilibrium the govemment, being the leader, announces its (fiscal) policy 
first (see e.g. Driffill, 1986) and subsequently, the union sets the wage. In this paper, 
the game between the govemment and the union is not explicitly modelled, since com-
pared to trade union preferences, the modelling of govemment utility takes a rather ad 
hoc character and is not satisfactory formalised3. Furthermore, we consider policy 
rules to be closest to the actual situation in the Netheriands with regard to the link. 
Therefore, in this paper, it is assumed the govemment sets a policy rule, so that our 
model boils down to utility maximization by the union under the constraint of a policy 
rule. This position of the govemment is rather close to being the Stackelberg-leader in 
a game with the union, if the govemment is implicitly assumed to maximize its utility by 
setting a certain policy rule. Then, the govemment announces its tax and benefit policy 
and the union sets its wage subsequently. 
After having discussed atomistic and centralised wage determination, we now 
examine how wage determination at the intermediate level (at branch or sector level) 
1
 The 1972 and the 1982 agreements between the trade union federations, the 
employers' federations and the govemment may be interpreted as the only two 
examples of co-operative Solutions since 1963 in the Netheriands. 
2
 Since, each player nas the incentfve to play unco-operatively in the final round, 
he also have the incentive to play the same in the final but one round, and therefore in 
the final but two round, etc... (see e.g., Kreps, 1990). 
3
 Public choice literature suggests that a govemment who wants to be re-elected 
may have a utility function which depends on more economie variables (the rate of 
inflation, the number of unemployed, the economie growth rate, and/or the size of the 
public sector, see e.g. Nordhaus, 1975, and Frey, 1978, cited in Van Winden, 1990), 
than those specified in the private welfare functions (Mulder, 1988a) or the loss-function 
(Hersoug, 1986 and Driffill, 1986). 
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differs from the centralised level. The simplest way to illustrate the effect of a 
decentralisation is by means of the 'monopoly union model', assuming that the wage 
rate is now set in two sectors and thus by more than one union (see e.g.: Gylfason 
and Lindbeck, 1984a and 1984b, Calmfors and Drifflll, 1988, Mulder, 1988b, Jacobs and 
Janssen, 1990). In this model, unions will set higher nominal wages due to three 
effects4. Firstly, there may be a price effect. If one union increases its wage, it induces 
the union in the other sector to act similariy, because the latter's utility is threatened by 
a loss in purchasing power due to increased prices which result from higher wages in 
the former sector. Secondly, higher wages for one union may trigger off tax increases 
due to higher unemployment, which lowers the utility of the other union, which is again 
induced to increase its wage demands5. Thirdly, there rnay be envy effects, which 
lower the utility of one union if the other union manages to agree a higher wage. In 
sum, a movement from the centralised level to a more decentralised level will, under 
the circumstances described above, lead towards higher wages. In this paper, it is 
assumed that wage formation in the Netherlands can be adequately described by the 
assumption of an encompassing trade union. If the separate unions collude, or rf they 
have correct expectations of demand and what the other union does, the relatively low 
wages, as under centralism, are possible. Moreover, as Jackman (1990) argues, a fall 
in the aggregate employment rate caused by one union, may depress the re-employ-
ment probability for the other union, leading to a lower wage claim by the latter. 
3 OUTUNE OF THE MODEL 
In order to grasp the essentials, we first discuss a simplified version of the model. We 
assume that employers have risk-neutral preferences and determine employment 
according to the labour demand curve, which incorporates the usual property that 
labour demand (L) is falling in gross wages (w), 
L = L(w), L'(w) < 0 (3.1) 
4
 See, Calmfors and Forslund (1990) for some counter arguments. 
5
 Mulder 1988b, has formalised the tax externality in a fairly simple model, which 
indeed confirms that decentralised wage setting leads to higher gross wages, reduced 
levels of employment and sometimes a smaller net wage rate. 
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Further, it is assumed that there is only one trade union which determines the wage 
rate, so that we apply the monopoly union model (see Oswald 1982, and 1986) to the 
game between the union and the firms. 
The trade union is assumed to maximjse the sum of its members utility, 
subject to the labour demand curve (3.1), 
MaxU(w,L) = Lu(wn) + (M-L)u(b) u'>0, u"<0 (3.2) 
where (wn) denotes the net wage rate (wn=(1-t)w) in which (t) captures both the tax 
rate and the rate of social security contributions, M the size of the labour force, and b 
the level of unemployment benefits. This utilitarian utility function is chosen because it 
can be explicitly derived from workers' attitude towards risk and nests alternative 
maximands6. The utility that ind'rviduals derive from their wage or benefit is repre-
sented by u(x), while the first and second order derivatives reflect the assumption of 
risk-averse preferences. This assumption is crucial for our conclusions regarding wages 
and employment under a certain policy rule. Note that we have omitted public sector 
employment in the utility function in order to simplify the analysis7. Furthermore, the 
size of the labour force is fixed, which makes the utilitarian function similar to the 
expected utility variant in which the utility of net wages and unemployment benefits is 
weighted by the probability to become empioyed (L/M) or to become unemployed ((M-
L)/M). 
In order to model the optimizing behaviour by the union, given the govern-
ment's policy rule, we follow the Scandinavian literature, assuming that our union is an 
encompassing trade union (see e.g. Mulder, 1988a and 1989, Calmfors and Hom, 
1986, Hersoug, 1986 and Driffill, 1986). In the simple version of the model, the govern-
ment fixes the unemployment benefit level and the tax rate and does not take the 
budget constraint into account. Thus the union maximises utility (equation (3.2)), given 
the level of benefits, the tax rate and the labour demand curve, which yields the 
following equation, 
6
 For certain values of risk-aversion, the utilitarian function is equal to other 
maximands like the wage bill, wL, or the rent over the employment benefit, (w-b)L, see 
Laidler and Estrin, 1989, p.361. 
7
 The number of government employees has shown to be rather rigid downwardly 
in the Netheriands, so that it is not unrealistic to assume that the government cannot 
economize on its budget by firing its employees. 
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Uw = L'(w)[u(wn)-u(b)] + (1-t)L(w)u'(wn) = O (3.3) 
Equation (3.3) expresses that the union equates the marginal cost of raising the wage 
rate, which is the number of people that lose their jobs (L'(w)) multiplied by the loss in 
utility [u(wn)-u(b)], to the marginal revenue of such a rise in wages, which is equal to 
the net utility gain of those who remain employed, (1-t)L(w)u'(wn). 
For the optimum to exist, the second order derivative ( U ^ must be 
negative: 
U ^ = L"(w)[u(wn)-u(b)] + 2(1-t)L'(w)u'(wn) + (1-t)2L(w)u"(wn) < 0 (3.4a) 
Substituting the first order condition into the second order condition and rewriting 
-wL"(w)/L'(w) as 7, the measure of concavity, -wL'(w)/L(w) as e, the labour demand 
elasticity and -wnu"(wn)/u'(wn) as r, the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk-aversion, 
yieids that, 
U ^ = [(1-t)L(w)u'(wn)/w][7-2£-r] < 0 if -y-2c-r < 0 (3.4b) 
The second order condition is negative if the labour demand function is concave 
(7<Q), or if the labour demand curve is not too convex 0<7<2c+r (see Mulder, 1989). 
Oswald (1982) surveyed the predictions of the model. Firstly, the size of the 
labour force does not affect the wage rate (dw/dM=0)8. Secondly, an increase in the 
benefit level increases the union wage demands (dw/db>0). Thirdly, tax rises have 
ambiguous effects on the wage rate: 
U^ = Lu'(wn)[£+r-1]>0, onlyif£+r>1 (3.5) 
Higher taxes have a positive effect on the wage rate (dw/dt>0) in the case that the 
sum of the labour demand elasticity and the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk 
aversion exceed one (c+r>1)9. This implies that the restriction holds with a downward 
8
 This is an implausible prediction, that follows directly from the utilitarian utility 
function. Instead, if we used the expected utility function, the size of the labour force 
would appear in the first order condition and thus also in its partial derivative to the 
labour force. 
9
 Using dUw = U^dw + U^dt = 0, dw/dt = - U ^ / U ^ . Therefore, if U^ is 
positive, dw/dt will also be positive (since Uww<0). In this case, the union's reaction to 
a rise in the tax rate will be to raise the wage rate, so that the union's reaction function 
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sloping labour demand functions and 'not too risk-averse preferences' of union mem-
bers. In a graph with the tax rate on the X-axis and the (gross) wage rate on the Y-
axis, the union's reaction function is positively sloped when this assumption holds. 
wage 
rate 
A 
r e a c t i o n f u n c t i o n 
tax rate 
Figure 1 : The union's reaction function and indifference curves 
Figure 1 shows a reaction function, which is drawn linearly for convenience, and the 
union's indifference curves. The slope of the union's indifference curve, which is given 
by dw/dt = -Ut/Uw, is infinite on any point on the reaction curve (Uw=0), for example 
in the points B and C. If we want to know the shape of the curve beyond these points, 
we need to derive the partial derivative of the utility function with respect to the tax 
rate, 
Ut - -wLu'(wn) < 0 (3.6) 
Thus, increasing w from any point on the union's reaction curve yields a negative slope 
of the utility curve, since both Ut and Uw will be negative (Uww<0) and hence, the ratio 
of -Ut/Uw will be negative too. Furthermore, the utility of the union increases as its 
is positively sloped. 
indtfference curves are closer to the Y-axis and reaches its maximum in point A (given 
a fixed wage rate the utility of the union increases when the tax rate is lowered). 
The economics behind this result are that, starting from a low wage (for 
example point D) and keeping the tax rate constant, the union can increase gross 
wages with a net utility gain until the reaction curve is reached; the rise in net wages 
and utility for employed members outweighs the loss in utility due to layoffs. Above the 
reaction curve, however, there occurs a net utility loss when the wage rate is increased 
(for example to point E). 
4 GOVERNMENT'S BEHAVIOUR 
4.1 Introduction 
In the model sketched above, the government fixes the tax rate and the level of 
benefits and it does not care about the budget constraint. Since this seems to be 
unrealistic, the modelling of government behaviour is now studied more carefully. As 
we have set out in Section 2, we assume that government behaviour can be modeiled 
as a simple policy rule. Sections 4.2-4.4 discuss the effects of three different policy 
rules, all under the assumption of balanced-budget: a fixed benefit level, an uncondi-
tional link of benefits to wages and a conditional link. The last policy rule is assumed to 
describe the situation, prevailing in the Netherlands in 1990 and 1991. It is assumed 
that in the Dutch institutional setting the government announces its poiicies first and 
wage setting takes place afterwards, whereas the government sticks to its issued policy 
after the wage has been set. 
4.2 Policy Rule 1 : the fixed benefit level 
It is assumed that the government wants to keep its budget in balance so that social 
security contributions are equal to unemployment insurance payments (abstracting 
from other government revenues and other expenditures): 
twL = (M-L)b (4.1a) 
Since, the tax rate is the endogenous variable in this section, we rewrite this to: 
t = [(M-L)/L].b/w (4.1b) 
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The government has two policy instruments, the tax rate and the level of benefits, to 
keep its budget balanced. In this section the government chooses the level of benefits 
to be the exogenous variable. 
The union takes the benefit level and the balanced budget constraint into 
account when maximizing its utility. Thus, it substitutes the tax rate out in its utility 
function, maximizing the utilitarian function (3.2) subject to equation (4.1a) and the 
iabour demand function, equation (3.1). The first order condition yields: 
Uw = L,(w)[u(wn)-u(b)] + u'(wn)L[(1-t) - wat/aw] = 0 (4.2) 
with: 
at/aw = -bM.{[£ + (M-L)/M] / \N*L} * 0 (4.3) 
Expression (4.3) is positive when: 
U | > |(M-L)/M| (4.4) 
Expression (4.4) states that, to keep balanced-budget, taxes have to rise with wages 
when the unemployment rate is smalier than the wage elasticity of Iabour demand (e); 
a condition which is likely to be fulfilled in the Netheriands10. 
Figure 2 shows the optimum for the union, given the level of unemployment 
benefits and the balanced-budget restriction (which is again assumed to be linear for 
convenience). At the intersection of the balanced-budget line with the Y-axis (point X), 
the tax rate is zero and there is full employment. In this situation, in which the union 
optimises against the balanced-budget restriction, the optimum wage rate is lower than 
in the situation of section 3, because the union intemalizes the tax effect of an increase 
in wages. Comparing equation (4.2) to (3.3), the marginal revenue of a rise in the wage 
rate is smaller in (4.2) than in (3.3) if dt/dw > 0. Since the second order condition 
(U^) is negative, the wage rate has to fall in order to equate marginal cost and 
revenue again. 
10
 See Den Butter, 1991, p. 29, for a survey of wage elasticities of Iabour demand 
in Dutch empirical macroeconomic models. These elasticities range between -0.25 
and -0.50, while Dutch unemployment rates have not exceeded 0.17. 
10 
wage 
rate *•>» 
UI 
uo 
\ reac t ion f unc t ion 
7 ba lanced budget 
X ^ ^ 
t* tax rate 
Figure 2 : The optimum for the union, given a fixed benefit ievel and the balanced 
budget restriction 
4.3 Policy Rule 2: the unconditional link 
Again it is assumed that the government wants to maintain balanced-budget, but now 
unemployment benefits are automatically indexed to the wage rate, reflecting more 
govemment's concern for an equal distribution of income. Hence, the govemment fixes 
the replacement ratio p, the ratio between benefits and wages. The balanced-budget 
constraint (4.1a) can now be rewritten as: 
t = P((M-L)/L) (4.5) 
in which: 
b = pw (4.6) 
The union optimises against the balanced-budget constraint, the fixed 
replacement ratio and the iabour demand curve, which yields the following first order 
condition for an optimum: 
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Uw = L'(w)[u(wn)-u(/>w)] + {M-L).pu'(pw) + u'(wn)L[(1-t) -w3t/aw] = O (4.7) 
with 
at/flw = -ML'(w)p / L2 > O (4.8) 
Equation (4.7) expresses that the union's marginal benefit of a wage increase, rises 
relative to the former policy rule by (M-L).pu'(pw) (see equation 4.2), since benefits for 
the unemployed go up with the wage rate. Due to this link between the wage rate and 
the benefit level, the union sets higher wages than in Section 4.2 under the fixed 
benefit level, although the tax effects due to higher wages differ (compare equations 
[4.7] and [4.3]). This holds under the assumptions that the union has risk-averse 
preferences and the net wage is higher than the level of benefits (see for a formal proof 
appendix A). 
Under the link policy, the slope of the balanced budget condition is steeper 
than under the policy of fixed benefits, shown in Figure 2. Although the optimal wage 
rate increases, the tax effect is ambiguous and determined by labour demand elasticity. 
For example, with an inelastic labour demand curve, higher wages lead to a compara-
tively small loss in employment, so that benefits for the newly unemployed (compared 
to the former policy rule) are paid out of a higher wage sum, implying that the tax rate 
is not required to rise to maintain balanced-budget. 
4.4 Policy Rule 3: a conditional link 
Under this policy rule, the government again links the unemployment benefit level to 
the wage rate, but on the condition that the tax rate does not have to rise to maintain 
balanced-budget. So, if the link causes additional financial problems for the govern-
ment, neither a rise in the tax rate, nor a cut in government employment are con-
sidered to be relevant options, and the level of the replacement ratio will be adjusted. 
Although, in reality other conditions were announced for the maintenance of the link in 
the Netheriands - stabilization of the ratio between working and non-working people 
and a moderation of wage rises -, the stabilization of the tax rate is regarded as the 
final goal of the Dutch government. Therefore, in this section, it is assumed that the 
union knows that stabilizing the tax rate is the principal aim of the government. The 
wage rate, set by the union, is derived, given a variable replacement ratio. 
Under policy rule 3, the union maximizes its utility, subject to the budget 
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constraint, the tax rate which is set by the government, and the labour demand curve. 
The balanced-budget constraint (4.1a) can now be rewritten as: 
P = t(L/(M-L)) . (4.9) 
in which: 
b = pw (4.6) 
The first order condition for an optimum is: 
Uw = UfwHufw^-ufpw)] + (M-L)u'(pw)(p + w3p/3w) 
+ u'(wn)L(1-t) = 0 (4.10) 
with: 
dp/dw - t{[L*(w)(M-L) + U(w)L] / (M-L)2} = tML'(w) / (M-L)2 < 0 (4.11) 
The second term in equation (4.10) expresses that, compared to the former policy 
rule - the unconditional link - of equation (4.7), the marginal benefit of a wage increase 
for the unemployed will be smaller: the union takes account of a fall in the replacement 
ratio when wages are increased. Appendix B proofs that (again assuming risk-averse 
union preferences and a net wage rate that is higher than the benefit level) unions will 
set a lower wage under the conditional link, compared to the unconditional link. 
Figure 3 shows the union optimum in the situation of the conditional link. The 
slope of the balanced-budget constraint is given by equation (4.11). Note that in Figure 
3 the balanced budget line is again shown as a linear relation. The slope of the union's 
indifference curve can be found by calculating dw/dp, which is equal to -Up/Uw by 
definition. Increasing w from the point at which the indifference curve has a vertical 
tangent11, for example from point A, yields a positive slope of the indifference curve, 
since Up is positive (see 4.12) and Uw is negative (U,^, < 0). 
Up = (M-L)u'(pw)w > 0 (4.12) 
The economics behind this result are that, increasing the wage rate from point A, the 
11
 This is where Uw = 3[Lu(wn) + (M-L)u(pw)]/3w = 0. 
13 
net utility gain for the union is negative, so that the replacement ratio is required to rise 
in order to hold union utility constant. 
w a g e 
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r t io * re p l a c e m e n t 
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Figure 3 : The optimum for the union, given the conditional link and the balanced 
budget constraint 
4.5 A comparison of the three policy rules 
In this section we compare the effects on wages and employment of the three policy 
rules. We have aiready discussed that: 
i) wages are higher when benefits are unconditionally linked to the private 
sector wage rate, compared to a fixed level of benefits (see section 4.3 and 
appendix A); 
ii) wages are lower when the link is conditional, compared to the unconditional 
link (see section 4.4 and appendix B). 
One can also proof, under realistic assumptions, that the union sets a higher wage rate 
under the conditional link than under a fixed benefit ievel (appendix C). Given the 
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inverse relationship between wages and private sector employment, we derive the 
results of Table 1. This table also shows the periods in which the various policy rules 
were actually used in the Netheriands. Taking the results of policy rule 1 (the fixed 
benefit level) as the benchmark case, wages are higher and employment is smalier 
under policy rule 3 (the fixed tax rate), while policy rule 2 (the fixed replacement ratio) 
generates even higher wages and, hence, smaller employment. 
Table 1 : Wages and employment under the three policy rules 
Policy rule Wages Employ-
ment 
Period in 
which pol-
icy was / 
is used in 
the Nether-
iands 
benefits tax rate replace-
ment ratio 
1 fixed variable variable 0 0 1981-1989, 
1992 
2 variable variable fixed + + - - 1969-1980 
3 variable fixed variable + - 1990-1991 
According to the outcomes of the different policy rules, we can distinguish 
various types of govemment behaviour. Policy rule 1 wouid imply that the govemment 
strongly values private sector employment and that equity considerations regarding the 
income distribution are of less importance. A govemment that acts according to policy 
rule 2, focuses on an equal development of benefits and wages and pays less attention 
to the consequences for private sector employment. Finally, when policy ruie 3 is 
applied, the stabilization of the tax rate is at the core of govemment policy and wages 
and employment take an intermediate position between the outcomes of policy rule 1 
and 2. Since the govemment utility function is not explicitly specified, it is impossible to 
determine which policy rule should be regarded as optimal from the government's 
point of view. If, for instance, govemment utility was modelled by a loss-function 
including the level of employment, along the line of Hersoug (1986, p. 130), the 
govemment would probably prefer policy rule 1. However, the govemment couid also 
aim at re-election by maximizing total compensation for employees, which would not 
lead to a clear preference for one of the policy rules. 
In the paper it is assumed a priori that govemment behaviour can be 
described by policy rules. The question is whether these rules are the relevant policy 
options for the Dutch govemment, especially since we have excluded the possibility of 
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cut-backs on public sector employment. Alternatively, it is possible to model the 
influence of the link on union behaviour as a game between the union and the 
government in which both players move simultaneously, resulting in a Nash-equilibrium 
(see Mulder (1988a)). Although this model resembles the situation under policy rule 2, 
the effects of the link - raising the wage rate and reducing private sector employment -
can be expected to be larger in Mulder's model since the union does not take account 
of the balanced-budget constraint when setting the wage rate. 
Another way to model the game between the union and the government 
would be the 'reversed Stackelberg game' (see Hersoug, 1986, p.140 and Pohjola, 
1986). This would be appropriate when the union is the first player to move and the 
government adjusts lts policy afterwards. In this reversed game, the union is able to 
maximise lts utility against the government reaction function and is Stackelberg-leader 
in the game with the government. However, given the strong adherence of the Dutch 
government to the stabilization of both the budget deficit and the tax rate, an adjust-
ment of its policy is not very probable. There may even be other, more sophisticated 
games, that give a more proper description of the Dutch situation. 
5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Our theoretical model predicts that the automatic link of benefits to wages wiil 
have a positive influence on the wage rate, and In this section, we examine whether 
our model finds support in the data. Therefore we specify a wage level equation which 
is consistent with modem bargaining theory and has been imbedded in the co-
integration technique (see Graafland and Huizinga, 1988, for the Netherlands). We 
assume that the influence of consumer prices and iabour productivity on wages can be 
described by the so-called wage space; the product of consumer prices and Iabour 
productivity. The wage space can be modelled without loss of statistical information 
and can be combined with actual wage determination in the Netherlands (Den Butter 
and Van de Wijngaert, 1991). Our theoretical model further requires to model the tax 
and premiums rate and the level of benefits, or the replacement ratio. Therefore the 
wage equation is specified as follows, 
w = f(ws, ur, t, p) (5.1) 
The wage sum per employee (w) is regressed on the wage space (ws), the unemploy-
ment rate (ur), the average tax and premium rate (t), and the replacement ratio (p). 
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In order to identrfy the effect of the link poiicy, we add an additive dummy 
variabie (D) for the period in which the link was abolished (poiicy 2, 1981-1989). If the 
dummies' t-value is significant and lts sign is negative, our hypothesis that an auto-
matic link increases the equiiibrium wage level cannot be rejected. However, the 
dummy may also measure the effects of Dutch wage restraints in the 1980s, which can 
either be due to general consensus between the negotiating parties and the govern-
ment, or to weak union power resulting from a decline in the unionization rate12. The 
results of the regressions are found in Table 2. 
Table 2: Equiiibrium wage equations for the Netherlands, 1969-1989. 
eq. WS ur
-1 t D P UNR R
2 DW LL 
1 0.98 
(36.2) 
-1.66 
(11.7) 
0.83 
(3.8) 
- - - .9989 1.34 60.848 
2 0.97 
(45.5) 
-1.37 
(9.6) 
0.88 
(5.1) 
-0.03 
(3.2) 
- - .9994 1.90 66.157 
3* 0.96 
(38.5) 
-1.22 
(7.3) 
0.45 
(2.2) 
- 0.34 
(3.3) 
- .9994 2.01 63.723 
4* 0.96 
(46.7) 
-1.15 
(7.7) 
0.57 
(3.1) 
-0.02 
(2.3) 
0.25 
(2.4) 
- .9995 2.42 66.936 
5 0.95 
(33.9) 
-1.09 
(3.7) 
0.78 
(3.9) 
- - 0.64 
(2.2) 
.9992 1.67 63.542 
D = dummy (0=link, 1 =no link); IX = Log Likelihood; the constant is < 
in parentheses; * refers to the 1969-1988 period. 
imitted to save space; t-vaiues 
Equation 1 of Table 2.5 shows a Standard equiiibrium wage level equation for 
the Netherlands which is staWe over the sample period13. The dummy variabie of 
Equation 2 of Table 5.2, which reflects the influence of an abolishment of the automatic 
link, signtficantly differs from zero and obtains a negative sign. Our analysis however 
suggests that the benefit level, or the replacement ratio, shouid be included in the 
equiiibrium wage equation. According to Equation 3, the replacement ratio for the 
minimum benefit levels has a positive influence on the equiiibrium wage rate. Again 
adding a dummy for the no-link period to Equation 3 shows that an abolishment of the 
12
 Wage restraints, have received support from employers, employees and the 
govemment in the 1980s, and were non-existent in the 1970s. The unionization rate is 
defined as the ratio of union members to total employment. 
13
 The Chow test-statistic (2,47) is under its critical level. 
17 
link still has a negative influence on wages. Thus, even if the level of the replacement 
ratio is included in the equilibrium wage equation, the automatic link policy increases 
the equilibrium wage level. Equations 2-4 do not reject our hypothesis that an abolition 
of the link policy leads to lower wages. However, as stated above, the dummy may 
also refiect the consensus in industrial relations. Those who believe that union wage 
restraints were due to massive unemployment and the exodus of union members, may 
find support in Equation 5 of Table 2, which shows that wages go up with the union-
ization rate (UNR) over the sample period14. Specifying both the dummy variable and 
the unionization rate unfortunately gave insignificant t-values for the latter variable. 
Since our theoretical model requires a specification of the influence of unemployment 
benefits we believe that Equation 4 rather than in Equation 5 gives a proper description 
of equilibrium wage formation. Therefore, we conclude that in order to give the dummy 
a ciear interpretation it is impossible to discern between the consensus or the link 
hypothesis. Due to deficiencies in the data set, finally, we could not test whether the 
conditional link of 1990 and 1991 have raised equilibrium wages. Moreover, we note 
that the conditional link seems to have been a short intermezzo since for 1992 the 
Dutch government has returned to a fixed benefit policy again. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have introduced a model in which the wage and employment effects 
of linking the level of unemployment benefits to the wage rate are analyzed. More in 
general, this paper is concemed with the efficiency costs (in terms of a loss in private 
sector employment) of social security policies. Since the link of benefits to private 
sector wages is at the core of the attention in Dutch economie policy at present, these 
effects are of clear interest. For this reason, we have based the assumptions regarding 
government behaviour (/.e. the modelling of three policy rules) on its empirical signifi-
cance. Due to this specification of policy rules, we have restricted our model to 
constrained utility maximization by the union, implicitly assuming that the government 
chooses its optimal policy rule. 
14
 This equation is, however, based on a different theoretical model. Instead of 
using the theoretical assumption that the union sets the wage, we assume that the 
trade union and the employers' federation bargain the wage. In other words, we 
assume the 'right to manage model' and we therefore need to specify the union's 
bargaining power over the wage, which we assume to depend on the unionization rate 
and the unemployment rate. 
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Compared to the Standard literature on centralised wage setting, this model 
introduces three novelties. First, it describes incomes poiicies instead of employment 
policies. Second, the government is assumed to make the first move in the game with 
the trade union, instead of assuming that both players make their moves simulta-
neously, or that the government cheats on a previously announced policy. Third, the 
government is always assumed to keep a balanced budget, which is therefore taken 
into account by the trade union. 
Under the assumptions of risk-averse preferences of employees and of net 
wages exceeding unemployment benefits, the model yields the following predictions. 
Firstly, if the government prefers to fix the level of benefits, wages are lowest and, 
assuming a negatively sloped labour demand curve, employment is highest. Secondly, 
if the government decides to link the level of benefits to private sector wages, the wage 
rate will be highest, and hence, employment lowest. Thirdly, rf the government decides 
to make the link conditional, the wage and employment outcomes are between these 
extreme outcomes. 
The tax and benefit policies were actually applied in the Netherlands over the 
last two decades: the fixed benefit rule in the 1980s, in which fighting unemployment 
was clearly more important government target than a proportional development of 
wages and benefits; policy rule 2, the unconditional link, in the 1970s and policy rule 3, 
the conditional link, in the beginning of the 1990s. Estimating an equilibrium wage 
equation for the Netherlands, we come to the conclusion that the data do not seem to 
reject our hypothesis that abolition of the link in the 1980s has reduced the wage level. 
19 
REFERENCES 
Butter, F.A.G. den, (1991), "De empirie van de Arbeidsvraag," Research Memorandum 
1991-42, Free University, Amsterdam. 
Butter F.A.G den (1992) and R.F. van de Wijngaert, "Wage Inflation and Labour 
Confiicts in the Netheriands: an empirical investigation using the co-integration 
approach," European Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming. 
Calmfors, L, (1986), Trade Unions, Wage Formation and Macroeconomic Stability - An 
Introduction," in L Calmfors and H. Horn (Eds.), Trade Unions, Wage Formation and 
Macroeconomic Stability, 1-17. 
Calmfors, L and J. Driffill, (1988), "Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macro-
economic Performance," Economie Policy, 6,13-61. 
Calmfors, L and A. Forslund, (1990), "Wage Formation in Sweden", in L Calmfors 
(Ed.), Wage Formation and Macroeconomic Policy in the Nordic Countries, Stockholm: 
SNS Förlag, 63-130. 
Calmfors, L. and H. Horn, (1986), "Classical Unemployment, Accommodation Policies 
and the Adjustment of Real Wages," in L Calmfors and H. Horn (Eds.), Trade Unions, 
Wage Formation and Macroeconomic Stability, 92-119. 
Dunlóp, J.T., (1944), Wage Determination under Trade Unions, New York: Macmillan. 
Driffill, J., (1986), "Macroeconomic Stabilization Policy and Trade Union Behaviour as a 
Repeated Game," in L Calmfors and H. Hom (Eds), Trade Unions, Wage Formation 
and Macroeconomic Stability, 158-184. 
Graafiand, J.J. and F. Huizinga, (1988), Modelling a wage equation for the Netheriands, 
Research Memorandum no. 51, Central Planning Bureau, 's Gravenhage. 
Gylfason, T. and A. Lindbeck, (1984a), "Union Rivalry and Wages: An Oligopolistic 
Approach", Economica, 51,129-139. 
Gylfason, T. and A. Lindbeck, (1984b), "Competitive Wage Claims, Cost Inflation and 
Capacity Utilization", European Economie Review, 24, 1-21. 
Hersoug, T., (1986), "Workers versus Government-Who Adjusts to Whom?", in L 
Calmfors and H. Hom (Eds.), Trade Unions, Wage Formation and Macroeconomic 
Stability, 128-150. 
Jackman, R., (1990), "Wage Formation in the Nordic Countries Viewed from an 
International Perspective", in L Calmfors (Ed.), Wage Formation and Macroeconomic 
Policy in the Nordic Countries, Stockholm: SNS Förlag, 289-322. 
Jacobs, J. and M. Janssen, (1990), "Coordinating Unions, Wages and Employment, De 
Economist, 138, 321-339. 
Kreps, D.M., (1990), A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Hertfordshire: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. 
Laidler, D and S. Estrin (1989), Introduction to Microeconomics, New York, Philip Allan. 
20 
Mc Donald, I. and R. Solow, (1981), "Wage Bargaining and Employment," American 
Economie Review, 71-5, 896-908. 
Mulder, C.B., (1988a), "Inefficiency of Automaticaily Linking Unemployment Benefits to 
Private Sector Wages in a Trade-Union, Government, Firm Context", unpublished 
paper. J 
Mulder, C.B., (1988b), "Wage Moderating effects of Corporatism. Decentraiised versus 
Centralised Wage Setting in a Union, Firm, Government Context," Discussion Paper 
316, University of Tilburg, Dept. of Economics. 
Mulder, C.B., (1989), "Efficiënt and Inefficiënt Institutional Arrangements between 
Governments and Trade Unions: An explanation of high unemployment, corporatism 
and union bashing," Discussion Paper 375, Tilburg University, Dept. of Economics. 
Nickell, S. and M. Andrews, (1983), "Unions, Real Wages and Unemployment," Oxford 
Economie Papers, 35, S183-206. 
Oswald A.J., (1982), The Microeconomic Theory of the Trade Union," Economie 
Journal, 92, 567-595. 
Oswald, A.J., (1986), The Economie Theory of Trade Unions," in L Caimfors and H. 
Horn (Eds.), Trade Unions, Wage Formation and Macroeconomic Stability, 18-51. 
Pohjola, M., (1986), "Comment on E.J. Driffill, "Macroeconomic Stabilization Policy and 
Trade Union Behavior as a Repeated Game", in L. Caimfors and H. Horn (Eds.), Trade 
Unions, Wage Formation and Macroeconomic Stability, 190-192. 
Winden, F.A.A.M. van, (1990), "Economische Theorie van de Politieke Besluitvorming", 
in L van der Geest (Ed.), Economische theorie: de stand van zaken, Schoonhoven: 
Academie Service, 125-148. 
21 
APPENDIX A 
Proof that unions set a higher wage rate when the level of benefits is linked to the 
gross wage (wz > wj. 
Write, 
Z = L'(w)[u(wn)-u(pw)] +(M-L).pu'(pw) + u'(wn)L[(1-t)-w3t/aw] +X = O (A.1) 
In this equation X equals zero if the second policy rule or the 'link situation' holds (Z2), 
whereas the first policy rule with a fixed benefit level (Z.,) holds, if: 
X = -[(M-L)/>u'(b)] + fu'fw^L-wfat/aw), - u'(wn)L-wat/aw)2], (A.2a) 
with subscripts (1,2) referring to dt/dw under policy rule one and two. Now, with 
negative X, Z2 exceeds Z v so that comparing situation 2 to situation 1, Z is required to 
increase in order to make Z equal to zero again. Since 82/dw, which is in fact the 
second order condition Uww, is negative, the wage rate needs to fall. In other words, 
the wage rate under the second policy rule is higher than under the first, if we can 
prove that X is negative. Now, rewrite X in (A.2a) as, 
X = -[(M-L)pu"(b)] + u'twJL-wKat/aw), - 3t/aw)2] (A.2b) 
We substitute equation (4.3) and equation (4.8) into equation (A.2b), so that the part of 
equation ((A.2b) in square brackets, [(dt/dw)1 - (dt/dw)2], can be rewritten as, 
-b[L'(w)wM/(wL)2 + L(M-L)/(wL)2] - [-MU(w)p/L2], (A.3a) 
replacing b=pw yields, 
-p[L'(w)M/L2 + L(M-L)/wL2] - [-MU(w)p/L2], (A.4a) 
pre-multipiication by 1/L2 gives, 
-p/L2[L'(w)M + L(M-L)/w] - [-ML"(w)p/L2], (A.4b) 
which simplifies to, 
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-p(M-L)/wL (A.4c) 
Thus, X can be rewritten as, 
X = -[(M-L)pu'(b)] - u'(wn)L(w).w[-PL(M-L)/(wL2)], (A.5a) 
which simplifies to, 
X = -[(M-Dpu^b)] - u'(wn)-p(M-L), (A.5b) 
and can be rewritten as, 
X = -(M-L)p[u'(b)-u'(wn)] < 0 (A.5c) 
So, X is negative if the utility of a marginal increase in the unemployment benefit 
exceeds a marginal increase in the net wage rate, u'(b) > u'(wn). This condition is 
satisfied when both the net wage exceeds the benefit level, wn > b, and the union is 
risk averse, u"(x) < 0. We appreciate that these conditions are very likely to be 
fullfilled. 
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APPENDIX B 
Proof mat union set a lower wage under a conditional link than under an unconditional 
link (w3 < w£. 
Again, we write, 
Y = L'(w)[u(wn)-u(pw)] + (M-L)u'(pw)(p+wap/aw) 
+ u'(wn)L(1-t) + X = O (B.1) 
In equation (B.1) with Y equai to zero, the conditional link situation (Y3) hoids, whereas 
in the unconditional link situation (Y2), X is equai to, 
X = -(M-L)u'(pw)(w3p/dw) + u'(wn)L-wat/aw (B.2) 
Now, with positive X, Y2 exceeds Y3, and in order to make Y equai to zero again the 
wage raeeds to increase, since the second order condition is negative: U,^, = dY/dw 
< 0. Thus, the wage in situation 3 is lower than in situation 2, if we can prove that X > 
0. Therefore, we substitute dp/dw of equation (4.11) and dt/dw of equation (4.8) into 
equation (B.2), 
-(M-L)u'(pw)w.[tML'(w)/(M-L)2] + u ' ^ L - w r - M I J M p / L 2 ] (B.3a) 
which simplifies to, 
-u'fcwJw.tL'MM/fM-L) + u'(wn)w[ML'(w)p/L] (B.3b) 
Substitution of p = t[L/(M-L)] into equation (B.3b) yields, 
X = -u'(pw)w.tL*(w).M/(M-L) + u'(wn)w[L'(w)tM/(M-L)] (B.4a) 
which is equai to, 
X = wL*(w)t[M/(M-L)].[u,(wn)-u'(pw)] (B.4b) 
X is greater than zero tf L'(w) < 0, which is true by assumption, and if the assumptions 
u"(x) < 0 and wn > b hold (see, also Appendix A). 
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APPENDIX C 
Proof that the union sets a lower wage rate if the benefit level is exogenous than if this 
level is conditionally linked to the wage rate. 
Again we write, 
G = L'(w)[u(wn)-u(/>w)] + (M-L)u'(pw)(p + w3p/3w) + 
+ u'(wn)L(1-t) + X = O (C.1) 
In equation (C.1), X equals zero if situation 3 - the conditional link - holds (G3), 
whereas situation 1 - of exogenous benefits - (Gt) holds if, 
X = -(M-L)u'(pw)(p+w3p/aw) + u'(wn)Lw.3t/3w (C.2) 
Therefore, with positive X, G1 exceeds G3, and in order to move from situation 1 to 
situation 3, G is required to fall and hence, the wage is required to rise, since U ^ = 
3X/3w < 0. Thus, we must prove that X is positive. Substitute dp/dw of equation 
(4.11) and dt/dw of equation (4.3) out into equation (C.2), 
X = -(M-L)u'(pw)p -(M-L)u'{p\N)w.[tML'(w)/(M-L)z) + 
+ u'(wn)L.w.-b{[L'(w).wM + L(w)(M-L)]/(wL)2} (C.3a) 
which equals, 
X = -(M-L)u'(pw)/> -u'(pw)w.tML'(w)/(M-L) + 
+ u'(wn)L.w.-b{[L'(w).wM+L(w)(M-L)]/(wL)2} (C.3b) 
Note that b-pw and p=tL/(M-L) so that b=twL/(M-L), which again are substituted into 
(C.3b). Then the left hand term reduces to, 
-(M-L)u'(pw)[tL/(M-L)] - u'(pw)w.tL'(w)M/(M-L) (C.4a) 
which is equal to, 
-tLu'(pw) - u'(pw)wtL'(w)(M/(M-L)) (C.4b) 
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whereas, the right hand term equals, 
u'(v/n)L.}N.-b.{[L\w).}^+L(v/){M-L)]/(wLf} (C.4c) 
which is equal to, 
t(wL)2u'(wn)/(M-L).{[L'(w).wM + L(w)(M-L)]/(wL)2} (C.4d) 
and simplifies to, 
tu'fwgtL'fa»).w(M/(M-L)) + L(w)]. (C.4e) 
So X equals, 
X = -tLu'(pw) - u'(pw)wtL'(w)(M/(M-L)) + 
+ tu'(wn)[L,(w).w(M/(M-g)+L(w)] (C.5a) 
Rewriting (C.5a) yields, 
X = -t{u'(pw)[L+wL'(w)(M/(M-L)] + 
-u'(wn)[L'(w).w(M/(M-L))+L(w)]} (C.5b) 
Substituting the demand elasticity, e = -L'(w)w/L, into (C.5b), 
X - -t/L{u'(pw)[1-Cw(M/(M-L)] - u'(wn)[-£w(M/(M-L)) + 1]} (C.6a) 
which is equal to, 
X - +t/L[1-£w(M/(M-L))Hu'(wn)-u,(pw)} > 0 (C.6b) 
Thus the X-term is positive in two cases. First, if u"(x) < 0, wn > pw (see Appendix A) 
and 1-cw(M/(M-L)) < 0. This latter term is negative if | ew\ > M/(M-L), which condition 
is likely to be fullfilled in the Netherlands. Second, X could also be positive, if u"(x) > 
0, which would imply risk loving behaviour and | cw | < M/(M-L). We have indicated 
elsewhere in the paper that this last condition is not likely to be fulfilled in the Nether-
lands. Neither we believe that the union (or its members) show risk-loving preferences. 
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